1 Polit. Pamphlets 116.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

DUTCH:

CONTAINING

A candid Examination whether there was any juſt Reaſons to expect they ſhould concurr with us in declaring War againſt *France*, or whether there be any ſufficient Cauſes to warrant the preſent Clamour againſt them.

Interſperſed throughout with impartial Remarks on the Behaviour of our Miniſters towards them in ſeveral important Conjunctures.

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

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OF THE

DUTCH.

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Conduct of the *Dutch*.

THERE ſeems to be at preſent a very great Spirit rais'd againſt the only uſeful Allies we have, againſt thoſe whom we have been over and over told can have no other Intereſt than Ourſelves, and yet it is now thought reaſonable that we ſhould hate them for being ſo ſolicitous about their own Intereſts. It is very certain that this Conduct of ours muſt flow from our con-

ceiving Things in a falſe Light, or from our making abſurd and ill-founded Deductions, tho' from right Principles. For if it be true, that the Intereſts of this Nation and thoſe of the *States-General* of the *United Provinces* are and muſt be always the ſame, then it manifeſtly follows, and can never be denied, that they have a Right to purſue their own Intereſts with the utmoſt Vigour, without fear of incurring our juſt Diſpleaſure, becauſe in ſo doing they muſt purſue our Intereſts as vigorouſly. But it is very poſſible that a Nation, or at leaſt a Government, may miſtake it's own Intereſts; and if the *Dutch* have done this, they muſt, according to the Notion of our new Politicians, have miſtaken ours likewiſe; and conſequently, ſuppoſing this the Caſe, we have a juſt Right to be offended with them for acting ſo as to weaken the common Intereſt, and bring a heavy Diſtreſs upon both Nations.

But in the midſt of theſe Jealouſies, Miſunderſtandings and Complaints, we ought to reflect that it is not at all impoſſible that this Clamour againſt the *Dutch* may be

be artfully rais'd to divert the Attention of the Publick from the Conduct of thoſe who may be much more to blame, and whoſe Counſels and Operations may very poſſibly have driven the *Dutch* unavoidably upon thoſe Meaſures which are ſo loudly and generally condemned. I do not ſay this is the Caſe; but if it were ſo, it would not be the firſt Time that the Friends and Creatures of an Adminiſtration in *Britain* had endeavour'd to throw the Load, which ought to lie on their Patron's Shoulders, upon our Allies: It muſt indeed be owned, that conſidering the great Reputation which our Statesmen have ſo juſtly gained for their Abilities, Steadineſs, and perfect Knowledge in Foreign Affairs, there can be but little room for ſuch a Suſpicion at preſent, which inſtead of hindering, ought to forward this Enquiry, ſince beyond a Queſtion it will give great Pleaſure to our upright Miniſters to ſee it purſued with the greateſt Freedom, and in its utmoſt Extent.

The Fate of a Nation is certainly a Thing of very great Importance, and ought

to be handled with equal Skill and Impartiality; but the Fate of our own Nation touches us ſtill more cloſely, every Man's private Intereſt is bound up therein, and if the Publick ſuffers, Individuals muſt feel, and conſequently muſt have a Right to enquire from whence their Sufferings come; otherwiſe it is a Jeſt to ſay that we are a free People; and as Things ſtand at preſent, I am ſure jeſting is very improper; and therefore, in the handling this Subject, I dare promiſe the Reader, that he ſhall find me in downright Earneſt. As I deſign however to be very ſhort, I ſhall not enter into a large Field of Politicks, or pretend to diſcuſs in a narrow Compaſs abundance of political Theorems, but ſhall confine myſelf to the Examination of a ſingle Queſtion, which, I conceive, when it is once decided, will enable every Man of common Senſe in this Kingdom to judge perfectly of this Matter, and to determine for himſelf, who is moſt to be blamed, or at leaſt, who is moſt miſtaken.

The Queſtion then which I propoſe to handle in this political Diſſertation, is,

What

What the ſtanding Notion of the *Dutch* Government hath been in regard to their own Intereſts in Caſes where a Quarrel has been commenced about the Balance of Power and the general Concerns of *Europe*. For if we can once find this out, it will be no difficult Matter to reſolve all the different Queries that have been, or can be raiſed upon this Subject. We ſhall (for Example) be able from hence to affirm or deny that the Intereſt of the *Dutch* is the ſame with our own; we ſhall from hence diſcover what our Stateſmen ought to have expected from them from the very begining of this Diſpute; and we ſhall be able peremptorily to declare, whether in their Management for ſome Years paſt they have adhered to their ancient Maxims, or whether thro' Fear, thro' Corruption, or from any other ſiniſter View they have been tempted to digreſs into a new Path, and thereby to have given Occaſion to a juſt Cenſure of abandoning their own Intereſts and ours, or, in the modern Phraſe among Politicians, become Betrayers of the common

common Cauſe, and Inſtruments of the common Enemy.

The Reader will perceive, that I all along take it for granted, that the true Intereſts of a Government may be known, and that they are ſuch as the ableſt and beſt Politicians in any Country have declared them to be. There is no ſuch Thing as reaſoning in any Science, and leaſt of all in Politicks, if we do not fix and agree upon ſome Foundation; and that this which I have fixed upon is a juſt Foundation, will appear from hence, that there can be no other laid: For when we ſay that ſuch a Country has the ſame Intereſt with our own, or that ſuch another Country hath an Intereſt directly oppoſite to our own, we muſt be either underſtood to mean what the Politicians in thoſe Countries lay down to be their Intereſt, or our Aſſertion has no Meaning at all, and we neither underſtand ourſelves, nor can be underſtood by others. Beſides, when certain Principles are laid down and followed for a long Series of Years, they become *de facto* the Intereſts of the Country where they are followed; and tho' it might be

poſſible

poſſible for Men of ſubtile Parts and enterprizing Notions to ſhew that theſe Principles ought to be chang'd; yet till this Turn of Reaſoning of their's receives a publick Sanction, and thoſe Principles are actually chang'd, no foreign Nation can take any Notice of them, but muſt be guided in its Conduct towards, and in its Expectations from ſuch a Government, by the Principles they avow. And thus this Point being clear'd, we will next endeavour to find out what the general Principles are which the *Dutch* Republick has owned for the general Maxims and Rules of her Conduct.

There have been but two Kinds of Government, or rather, two different Forms of Adminiſtration in *Holland* ſince it became a Republick, and ſhook off the Yoke of the *Spaniſh* Tyranny. The firſt of theſe was under the Direction and Auſpice of a Stadtholder, a Word which originally ſignified the ſame with Lieutenant, and was uſed to expreſs the Power of the King of *Spain*'s Governor in any of the Provinces; but in Regard to the Republick, this Title had a new Senſe impoſed upon it, and came to

ſignify

ſignify, as I take it, much the ſame Thing with the *Roman* Dictator. I do not indeed ſay that he had by their Conſtitution an Authority at all approaching that of the *Roman* Magiſtrate; but whatever Authority he had from the Conſtitution, moſt certain it is, that in the Exerciſe of it, the Stadtholder very nearly reſembled the Dictator. The firſt of theſe was *William* I. Prince of *Orange*, to whoſe Prudence, Penetration, Induſtry, Valour and Fortune, the *United Provinces* owe their Freedom; and though I never heard Gratitude mentioned among the Number of *Dutch* Virtues, yet it is certain that they preſerve the Remembrance of their Obligations to that great Prince, whom they regard as the Father, Founder, and Legiſlator of their Country.

This very ſage and able Prince, (who had made the Intereſts of *Holland* the Study of his Life, was thought to know them as well, and to regard them as much, as ever any Politician did that had ſo large an Authority,) laid this down as a capital Maxim for the Uſe of his Succeſſors in the Government of the Republick, *viz.* That the Inhabitants

habitants of the *Netherlands* ſhould ever keep a fair Correſpondence with *France*, do ſtrict Juſtice to all Strangers, and in all Revolutions whatever keep a firm and inviolable Peace with *England*. He made no Scruple of profeſſing that every Branch of his Rule was equally binding and indiſpenſible; and that whenever the Rulers of the Republick ſhould be tempted, either by a View of preſent Profit, or from the Apprehenſion of an impending Danger, to make free with any of theſe Clauſes, they would run a great Hazard of ruining and ſubverting their State. If we compare the ſeveral Hiſtories that have been written of *Holland*, from the Death of that Prince of *Orange*, to the Beginning of the laſt general War, we ſhall find that the *Dutch* ſcarce ever digreſſed from theſe Principles, but with infinite Pains, and admirable Addreſs, conſtantly endeavoured, and commonly ſucceeded, in keeping a fair Correſpondence with *France*, and yet maintaining an inviolable Peace with *England*, notwithſtanding the declar'd Oppoſition of the Views and Meaſures of the two Crowns.

Upon the Death of the Prince of *Orange*, Father to King *William*, there happen'd a great Change in the Government of this Republick, and the great Stateſmen therein conſider'd this as a new Æra, reputing their Delivery from the Sovereignty of the Stadtholder, for ſuch at laſt they underſtood his Adminiſtration of the Government to be, as great a Bleſſing as the ſhaking off the *Spaniſh* Yoke. Every Body knows that this extraordinary Revolution was in a great Meaſure the Work of the famous Brethren *Cornelius* and *John de Wit*; the latter of theſe was the great Stateſman and Oracle, not only of the Party, but of the Republick; and he was ſollicited by the ableſt Men who lived in his Time, to draw up a Kind of Syſtem of Government, which he accordingly did, under the Title of *The Political Maxims of the State of* Holland: And this Book, ſince the ſecond Excluſion of the Stadtholderſhip, which happened on the Death of King *William*, has been regarded as the State-Bible, or the Political Alcoran of the *Dutch*.

If

If therefore we would know the Sentiments of the *Dutch* Stateſmen upon any Subject, we have nothing more to do than to conſult this Book, for here we are ſure to find their true and real Sentiments, thoſe by which they are conſtantly and abſolutely governed, and from which, if ever they depart, it is either by Force, and for a very ſhort Time, or only in Shew, and not in Reality, as for want of attending to this eaſy and certain Rule we have often felt to our Coſt. With Reſpect then to the Balance of Power, if we look into the fourth Chapter of the ſecond Part, we ſhall find that he treats the Balance of Power as a political Dream, and all the Schemes for preſerving it as downright Viſions. In the natural Body, ſays he, Phyſick always weakens, and the continual Uſe of it ſhortens a Man's Life. We may therefore well make Uſe of that wholeſome Counſel as moſt agreeable to our Provinces, *Uſe no Phyſician*; for if *Holland* takes Care to provide every Thing neceſſary, and then ſtands on her own Defence, ſhe is not to be overpowered by any Potentate in the World: But if we

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run to quench every Fire, from a timorous Apprehenſion that the Flame of War ſpreading through the Dwellings of others, ſhould at laſt catch our own Buildings, we ſhall certainly conſume ourſelves by Degrees, and by our own Precautions ſhall be undone. He therefore lays it down as a Rule, that they ſhould never be guided by what happens to their Neighbours, but adhere to the old *Dutch* Proverb, *If the Fire does not burn you, don't run to put it out.* And becauſe he knew this Subject was a very nice one, he has inſerted four Fables, which whoever reads, will plainly ſee, that in his Judgment there never was any Thing more ridiculous, than what has paſs'd for the Maſter-piece of Modern Politicks, the ſetting up a common Cauſe, and pretending to ſupply the Defects of Divine Providence by human Foreſight, and the Help of general Confederacies.

But being ſtill apprehenſive that this Doctrine might not be ſufficiently underſtood, he proceeds in plain Terms to deliver his true Meaning: And, that I may not be thought to wreſt or miſinterpret his Conceptions, I

ſhall give you his very Words. "This "therefore, ſays he, is the great and ne- "ceſſary Art for *Holland*, notwithſtanding "the Maxims before objected, *viz.* To "maintain Peace, and fortify our Frontiers, "and never unneceſſarily to meddle with "parting of Princes that are in War, by "our Ambaſſadors and Arbitrations; for "by theſe Means we ſhall be certainly drawn "into the Charge of a War, and beſides are "like to gain the Reward of Parters, and to "bring the War, or the Hatred of both "Parties upon ourſelves, beſides the Con- "ſumption of our Treaſure in expenſive "Embaſſies, even when the beſt happens. "And tho' the Troubles of this World can- "not be avoided always, either by Force or "Art, yet we ought to keep out of them as "much as we can, with all our Strength, "Prudence and Polity. And if, notwith- "ſtanding all this, War ſhould be made "upon *Holland*, ſhe will gain a double Re- "putation, when, with the Enlargement "of her own Strength, long before provi- "ded, together with the Juſtice and Ne- "ceſſity of her Defence, ſhe ſhall overcome

"the

" the Danger. Beſides the Oppoſition we
" ſhould be able to make, as well as the
" juſt Hatred that always attends the Agreſſ-
" or, and the Conſequences that might fol-
" low the Conqueſt of this Country, would
" alarm other Princes, and give them Time
" to deliver us. And tho' I know theſe
" Maxims will always be rejected by moſt
" of the idle Gentry, Soldiers of Fortune,
" and the ſottiſh Rabble, as if we, relying
" only on our impregnable Fortifications,
" and ſtanding on our Defence, ſhould by
" that Means loſe all that Name and Re-
" putation we have acquired. To which I
" ſhall only ſay, *That all is not Gold that*
" *gliſters, and ruſty Silver is more va-*
" *lued by Men of Underſtanding than*
" *glittering Copper: So whatever is pro-*
" *fitable to a Nation, brings alſo a good*
" *Reputation to Perpetuity.* 'Tis likewiſe
" certain, that whatever reduceth *Holland*
" to Weakneſs, tho' it were under the moſt
" glorious Title of the World, will really
" cauſe it to lie under an everlaſting Shame
" and Reproach. All which, GOD grant,
" may be rightly apprehended by the up-

" right,

" right, and now really free Magiſtrates of " *Holland*, while this leaky Ship of the " Commonwealth may yet by Labour be " kept above Water."

This in itſelf is ſo clear, and at the ſame Time ſo full, that there ſeems to be no Neceſſity of citing any Thing more: But, however, I think it may not be amiſs to add two other Maxims of this great Stateſman, with regard to the performing of Treaties. As to your Engagements, ſays he, be quick to receive, and ſlow to pay, for an Accident may happen, which may put it in your Power to pay nothing. To this he adds, that *it is good riding on the Fore-Horſe*, and always *keeping the Staff in your own Hands*, becauſe you may always give away as much of your Right as you will, and Nobody will hinder you from making yourſelf leſs. As to *France*, he takes great Pains to ſhew, that tho' no great Truſt ought to be repoſed in her Promiſes, yet the true Intereſt of *Holland* is to live upon fair Terms with that Crown. He examines alſo the *Dutch* Intereſt with Regard to *England*; and he agrees, that a War with *England*

land would be to their Prejudice and ours; and therefore he adviſes, that in all Diſputes they ſhould give us good Words, and gain Time, for Reaſons that are very extraordinary. If we do this, ſays he, many Accidents may happen that will extricate us out of our Difficulties. For Example, their Kings may wholly abandon themſelves to their Pleaſures, or their rapacious Miniſters by a continued Courſe of Thieving may plunge their Maſters in Debt, or a Death may happen luckily for us, or ſome other foreign Quarrel may divert the Storm, or Diſturbances at Home ſufficiently imploy their Cares. But above all Things, ſays he, it is our Buſineſs to be watchful, that we do not ſuffer ourſelves, for Fear of a War with *England*, to be drawn into an Alliance jointly to carry on an offenſive War againſt any Nation, which may be very formidable to that Country, and not ſo much to us; for, in ſo doing, we ſhould make ourſelves conſiderably weaker, and *England* ſtronger; who, having that Thorn pull'd out of their Foot, might afterwards, with leſs Fear, trample upon us, while we remain deprived of that Refuge by

our

our own Folly. The Truth is, that ſince *England* is more formidable to us than any Country in the Univerſe, it would be an unpardonable Fault in our Conduct, to make them ſtill more formidable to us than they are.

There needs no more upon this Subject; and if from what has been already ſaid, we cannot collect what the Sentiments are of the *Dutch* with regard to their own Intereſts, and with Reference to their Engagements with us and againſt *France*, it is impoſſible we ſhould be clear in any Point whatever. But how it came to paſs that while theſe Things were ſo well known, it ſhould come to be taken for granted that *Great Britain* and *Holland* have but one Intereſt, and that the *Dutch* muſt be always zealous in the Purſuit of our Intereſts, becauſe it is certain they will never neglect their own; I ſay how theſe Points came to be received for Goſpel in ſo judicious an Age as this, when the Goſpel itſelf has met with ſome very ſevere Criticks, is a Point I leave to be made out by ſuch as are bound in Honour and in

Intereſt to make it out, as having by their Arts or their Eloquence, their Authority or their Influence, made it a Rule of Action to their Country, and thereby brought her into the melancholy Circumſtances under which, without Help, and almoſt without Hope, ſhe ſtruggles at preſent.

I appeal to common Readers, and to Men in the ordinary courſe of Buſineſs; I ſay, I appeal to theſe People, whether it is not always thought adviſeable to make Enquiry into the Characters of People with whom they deal, and commonly to deal with them according to their general Characters. Now if this be the Caſe in common Life, if all Governments are but great Families, and if the true Principles of Oeconomy are the ſame in a Houſhold and in a State, as the ableſt Writers upon this Art agree, why ſhould not our Statesmen have taken ſome Pains (and we ſee that no great Pains were neceſſary) to acquaint themſelves with the Character of the *Dutch*, and with their particular Sentiments as to thoſe Points in which they were to have to do with them? Had they done this,

this, it is moſt certain they could not have been deceived; for they muſt have known that the *Dutch* would never declare War againſt *France*; that whenever they were preſs'd by us, they would be ſure to give us good Words, and nothing more; that they would conſider the humbling of *France* to the degree we deſire it, as pulling a Thorn out of our Feet; and that they would always have a ſecret Dread of the too great Succeſs of any War in which with them we were jointly engaged.

But in anſwer to this, it may be ſaid, that great Miniſters have other Ways of judging, as they have other Ways of Information, than the little low Writers of Pamphlets for Bread. But ſaying Things does not prove them; and whoever was the Author of a late Pamphlet, intitled, *A modeſt Enquiry into the State of Foreign Affairs*, has unanſwerably made it appear, that the Knowledge and Information of ſome People, does not extend ſo far as thoſe that are to furniſh the Expence of the Operations they ſuggeſt, had Reaſon to expect. That Writer has ſhewn from

Facts, that in Regard to the Syſtem of *Europe* in general, and of the Government of *Holland* in particular, they have either been ſtrangely impoſed upon themſelves, or have moſt ſcandalouſly impoſed upon the Nation, by raiſing with falſe Hopes, and depreſſing with falſe Fears the Spirits of the People; as if the Eſſence of modern Politicks conſiſted in temporary Expedients for drawing Money out of the Purſes of the Subject, and afterwards preventing all Enquiries into the Pretences uſed for obtaining ſuch extraordinary Supplies.

As to Informations, it is impoſſible that the common Sort of Men, who are guided by no higher Principle than common Senſe, ſhould have any great Opinion of them, while they ſee no leſs than two News-Papers in much better Credit for foreign News than the Paper by Authority, which in former Times was ſo conducted, as to be abſolutely unrival'd in that Reſpect. It is impoſſible in this Age to maintain Credit without Merit, tho' it may be very practicable to retain Power and Places with a ſmall Mixture of that coſtly Ingredient.

There

There may be, and doubtleſs there are certain privileg'd Places, where the Abilities of Men cannot be called in Queſtion; but when they condeſcend to appeal to the Public by the Preſs, they may be ſaid to wave that Privilege, and the *Engliſh* Nation, like an *Engliſh* Jury, will judge only according to Evidence, and be governed merely by Facts.

We will proceed then to compare the Conduct of the *Dutch* in the preſent War, which is a Thing obvious to all the World, and about which therefore there cannot be any Diſpute, with thoſe Principles which we have laid down, as the Rules that it might be preſumed they would act upon; and by this Means we ſhall diſcover, whether the Politicks of a Pamphleteer be be not as good as thoſe of our modern Stateſmen. This is the ſureſt and the ſafeſt Way of judging, and at this time of Day it appears plainly that we are to truſt no longer to Suppoſitions, our Reputation having declined in the ſame Proportion that our Expences have been enlarged; ſo that if we proceed any longer in the ſame

Courſe,

Courſe, there is nothing clearer or more certain, than that we ſhall entirely exhauſt our Wealth and Strength in the Proſecution of a ruinous Land-War, to no End or Purpoſe in the World, except enriching thoſe Princes from whom we hire Troops; and who by this very Syſtem of keeping up great Bodies of Troops in order to let them out for hire, have chang'd the whole Face of Affairs in *Europe*, and created ſuch an Intereſt to themſelves as is abſolutely incompatible with what is now called the common Cauſe, or indeed with any other Syſtem, except that of Mr. *Hobbs*, who ſuppoſed that the natural State of Man, was a perpetual State of Warfare; which, if they have any, muſt be the Maxim of theſe Princes, and a Maxim that cannot be beneficial to them, but in the very ſame Proportion that it is deſtructive to their Neighbours.

Their High Mightineſſes the States of *Holland* being aware of this, very wiſely judg'd at the beginning of the War, that ſupplying the Queen of *Hungary* with Money, would not only be a ſpecifick

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Performance of their Treaties, but likewiſe the moſt effectual Aſſiſtance they could give her; for if the Princes of *Germany*, who were all armed, were inclined to make a Stand in her Favour, Money was the only thing that could put them in Motion; and if they were not ſo inclined, the ſupporting that Princeſs againſt *France*, and her Allies, was a Taſk too heavy for the Maritime Powers, and indeed a Taſk that it was Madneſs for them to undertake; for it was at the Requeſt of the Empire, and for the Behoof of the Empire, that the Maritime Powers guaranty'd the Pragmatic Sanction; and therefore there was as good Reaſon to believe that the Princes and States of the Empire would exert themſelves in ſupport of this Guaranty, as for calling this the common Cauſe, and expecting that the Maritime Powers ſhould be as much or more concerned about it than for their own immediate Safety.

This Doctrine was at that Time likewiſe embraced here at Home by our old Miniſter, and his truſty Aſſociates; for he declar'd

Courſe, there is nothing clearer or more certain, than that we ſhall entirely exhauſt our Wealth and Strength in the Proſecution of a ruinous Land-War, to no End or Purpoſe in the World, except enriching thoſe Princes from whom we hire Troops; and who by this very Syſtem of keeping up great Bodies of Troops in order to let them out for hire, have chang'd the whole Face of Affairs in *Europe*, and created ſuch an Intereſt to themſelves as is abſolutely incompatible with what is now called the common Cauſe, or indeed with any other Syſtem, except that of Mr. *Hobbs*, who ſuppoſed that the natural State of Man, was a perpetual State of Warfare; which, if they have any, muſt be the Maxim of theſe Princes, and a Maxim that cannot be beneficial to them, but in the very ſame Proportion that it is deſtructive to their Neighbours.

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declared publickly, that he was againſt a War upon the Continent, and gave this Reaſon for it, that he knew the *Dutch* would never come into it. He had felt their Pulſe it ſeems upon this Subject, and found them ſteady Diſciples of *De Wit*, that is to ſay, reſolved punctually to fulfil their Treaties to the Queen of *Hungary*, without breaking with *France*. Nay more, this was likewiſe the *Hanover* Scheme, the Elector coming very heartily into the Choice of the late Emperor, and having great Expectations from him; ſo that hitherto we were all of a Mind, and there could be no Cauſe for charging the *Dutch* with any bad Conduct, becauſe the whole of our Conduct was of a Piece. But when it was found that the late Emperor *Charles* VII. even in his greateſt Diſtreſs, would not anſwer certain Purpoſes, then new Schemes were form'd, and the Terms of the War were altered, when we firſt began to exclaim againſt the *Dutch*. But with what Ground we exclaimed againſt them, does not very clearly appear; and becauſe this is a Point not much attended

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to, and yet the Point on which the whole turns, it is requiſite that if poſſible we ſhould clear it up.

It is to be obſerved that from the Beginning the *Dutch* had never interfered in the Oeconomy of the Empire, but had readily choſen the Part of acknowledging the Emperor *Charles* VII. as ſoon as he was elected, and treated him with Reſpect, tho' with a Reſpect mixed with Coldneſs, which plainly enough diſcovered how cloſely they adhered to their old Maxims, and how little they cared to depart from them either for the Sake of enlarging the War, or facilitating a Peace. Our great Miniſter that then was, had a due Senſe of this, and therefore never thought of calling in the States to the Conſultations, or, as they have been ſince very improperly ſtiled, the Treaty of *Hanau*. Now I deſire the Reader to obſerve, that he has had the Sentiments of two of our Miniſters as to the Conduct of the *Dutch*; the Firſt had ſounded them, and knew they would not come into a general War, for which Reaſon he avoided it; the other thought

they were ſo little to be depended on, in reſpect to his Schemes, that when he was concerting an Affair, which was either to bring about a general Peace, or to give an entire new Turn to the War, he never conſulted them at all.

By the Way, now we are talking of theſe Conferences at *Hanau*, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that there are better Reaſons than moſt People imagine, for ſuppoſing that there was ſomething very obſcure and very unfit for the publick View in the Tranſactions there, ſince the *Dutch* were not only excluded from them, but the Queen of *Hungary* alſo knew nothing of their Tendency, as ſhe has herſelf in the moſt ſolemn Manner declared. If this was a Negociation for the Benefit of the common Cauſe, and for promoting the general Tranquillity of *Europe*, what Excuſe can be made for not communicating the Matter to our Allies? but if this was no better than driving a private Bargain with the Emperor, in which it was propoſed, that a civil Liſt ſhould be given by *Great Britain*, upon certain Conditions,

ditions, which perhaps regarded ſome other Place; it was natural enough to make a Myſtery of this, ſince it was what was on all Accounts with reſpect to US, to the Queen of *Hungary*, and the *Dutch*, very improper to be revealed.

Yet inaſmuch as nothing was either communicated or demanded in relation to this Treaty from the *Dutch*, I never heard that they complained of it, or ſet up any Clamour againſt the Miniſter who conducted it, as, had we been in their Caſe, we moſt certainly ſhould have done; but their Deſire to avoid multiplying Engagements, to keep themſelves as much as poſſible out of freſh Troubles, and to ſtave off as long as they could taking part in a general War, wav'd any ſuch Complaints, how well ſoever they might have been founded and readily acquieſced in the whole Affair. But afterwards an Attempt was made by the *Engliſh* Party in *Holland* to fall upon Prince *William* of *Heſſe*, for not driving the Emperor into our Miniſter's Meaſures, which obliged that Prince to vindicate himſelf and lay

open the whole Affair as he has done, and that in ſuch a Manner, as very clearly proves, that it was to this Tranſaction we owed the ſubſequent Treaty of *Worms*, the Treaty of *Union* at *Frankfort*, and the new Turn given to the War.

The Treaty of *Worms*, by which we became Principals in the War in *Italy*, was negociated entirely without the Concurrence of the *Dutch*, as appears from the Treaty itſelf: One Article of which ſtipulates, that they ſhall be invited to accede to it, but ſure without the leaſt Appearance of their being brought into ſuch a Meaſure, which could contribute only to loading them with a greater Expence, and could not have done them the leaſt good in the World. Beſides, there was a latent Article in that Treaty, which like a Snake in the Graſs, might have bit them before they were aware. The Article I mean is the *tenth*, in which her *Hungarian* Majeſty makes over to the King of *Sardinia* her Right, if ſhe has any, to the Marquiſate of *Final*, which is a very ſtrange Expreſſion, though the very Expreſſion

uſed in the Treaty; becauſe her Father, the Emperor *Charles* VI. had expreſly made over not only his Right, but her's; and the Crown of *Great Britain*, and the *States General*, by the quadruple Alliance became Guaranties of this very Ceſſion to the *Genoeſe*. Now with what Face could the *Dutch*, who to that Time and to the preſent Time had, and have taken no other Share in this War, than as Guaranties of the Pragmatick Sanction; with what Face, I ſay, could the Governors of this Republick accede to a Treaty in expreſs Oppoſition to their own Guaranty?

But this was not all; for in the Cloſe of the ſame Article it is ſaid, that the contracting Parties are in juſt Expectation that the Republick of *Genoa* will facilitate, as far as ſhould be neceſſary a Diſpoſition ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary for the Liberty and Security of *Italy*, in conſideration of the Sum which ſhall be found due to the ſaid Republick, without his Majeſty the King of *Sardinia*, or her Majeſty the Queen of *Hungary* being obliged to contribute any thing to the Payment of this Sum.

Strange

Strange and wonderful indeed! The late Emperor the Queen of *Hungary*'s Father had ſold the Marquiſate of *Final* to the State of *Genoa*, who had paid him honeſtly for it, and had put all the Money into his Pocket; now the *Genoeſe* are to part with this Country, and to take their Money again whether they will or no, but the Queen of *Hungary* is not to pay a Penny of this Money, though Heireſs of him who received it; nor the King of *Sardinia*, who is to have the Country when the *Genoeſe* can be compelled to part with it. Who then is to pay this Money? Why, that is a Secret we are not let into by the Treaty; but as it is ſaid in the Beginning of the Article, that it was abſolutely neceſſary the K. of *Sardinia* ſhould have the Marquiſate of *Final*, in order to his having a direct Communication with the Sea, and with the *Maritime Powers*, it was no difficult Matter to gueſs that they were to pay the Money, which to be ſure was a Thing the *Dutch* could never be brought to think of. And thus if we are not reſolved to be blind, we

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may very eaſily ſee why the States-General were never conſulted about this excellent Contrivance to alter the State of the War, and to force the Republick of *Genoa* into an Alliance with the Houſe of *Bourbon*, in direct Oppoſition to the Intereſts of the common Cauſe, and to all the fair Pretences that had been hitherto made of preſerving the Balance of Power, and maintaining the Independency of the ſeveral States of *Europe*. So that in this Affair the *Dutch* were abſolutely innocent, and their Conduct much to be applauded.

The true Reaſon why I have laboured this Point ſo much is, to ſhew the *Engliſh* Reader, if he will be ſhewn it, that we have all along been at croſs Purpoſes with *Holland*; for while they laboured all that lay in their Power to remain Auxiliaries in the preſent War, we were taking the utmoſt Pains to become Principals; while they were ſoothing, we were provoking *France*; while they were catching at every Circumſtance that might have brought about a Negotiation, we were ſtudying to prolong the War: What Wonder then that we

ſhould

ſhould underſtand each other no better? Yet we all along declared, or at leaſt confeſſed, that nothing of Conſequence would be done, unleſs the *Dutch* join'd heartily with us. But how was this to be brought about, when it is evident that we went directly contrary to them in all Things; that in Matters of the greateſt Conſequence we never conſulted them; and that, notwithſtanding this, we were continually complaining that they did not do, what we had not the leaſt probable Reaſon to expect they ſhould do. Was this dealing fairly with the People at Home? was this acting juſtly towards our Allies abroad? was this reconcilable to the Principles of Policy? or, if it was, is that a Science built upon common Senſe?

But the Truth of the Matter is, our Politicians were not ſo very weak as to be deceived themſelves; their great Fault conſiſted in an overweening Fondneſs for their own Abilities, and an ill-grounded Perſuaſion that they were able to over-reach others. This put them upon perſuading us here at home in the Winter, that they had negotiated the

Dutch

Dutch into their Meaſures, and upon imploying all their Summers in endeavouring to force them into their Meaſures; ſo that it is hard to ſay, which we ought moſt to regret, their Succeſs here, or their Want of it there: The firſt has coſt us Sums ſcarce to be computed; the laſt has coſt them a Barrier, which both they and we ſpent an immenſe Flood both of Blood and Treaſure to obtain, and all this to no Purpoſe in the World, which might have been very eaſily ſeen from the Beginning: And if our Politicians wanted the neceſſary Diſcernment for that, what happened laſt Year muſt have opened their Eyes, if they had not determin'd to keep them ſhut, and that in Spight both of Reaſon and Evidence.

To be convinced of this, let us conſider, that if any Thing could have drawn our Allies to have fallen into our Meaſures, and have acted offenſively, it muſt have been our Superiority in the laſt Campaign, when, if we would, we might have undertaken any Thing in *Flanders*. But from the Operations of that Campaign it moſt evidently

appeared, that the *Engliſh*, *Auſtrians*, and *Dutch*, purſued each a ſeparate Plan. The firſt would have acted at all Events againſt the Enemy, to which the ſecond were but half inclin'd, and the laſt not at all. The *Auſtrians* were bent upon covering *Bruſſels*, and their own Territories, which has likewiſe been their Plan this Year; the *Dutch* were for huſbanding their Troops, preſerving their Barrier as much as they could, and avoiding whatever might oblige *France* to declare War againſt them. From an Army in this Situation, what was there to be hoped, or rather, what was there not to be feared? The Event was ſorrowful, but not ſtrange; unlucky, but not unlook'd for: They came together and did nothing, they parted, and charg'd this Inaction upon each other. A miſerable Concluſion indeed!

Theſe fatal Conſiderations, one would have thought, ſhould have been a ſufficient Warning; and I believe every Body here, that was not in the Secret, expected that there ſhould have been ſome Change of Mea-

Meaſures: I mean a Change of Meaſures in regard to the Publick, and not in reference to Parties; for with reſpect to the People, it is all one by whom they are injur'd, and they can no more be ſatisfied with having Wrongs done them, by having one Set of Men rais'd to the Capacity of doing them, than another left in it. Yet this was all the Change with which they were gratified; but becauſe ſomething of the ſame Kind had been very often practis'd to very little Purpoſe, it was reſolved that a ſmall Circumſtance ſhould be added: And what was that? Why truly the new Men, whoſe Characters were yet unſpotted, and conſequently who had ſome Reputation to ſtake, were put upon declaring, that the *Dutch* had abſolutely parted with their own Notion of Things, and had adopted ours: That is to ſay, were reſolved to come into vigorous Meaſures to repair the Slips made in the laſt Campaign, and to exert the utmoſt of their Force in this. It was from their full Conviction of the Reality of this Change that theſe new great Men juſtified their own.

But now, when Experience hath demonſtrated the Falſity of this, when the *Dutch* have plainly ſhewn as little Inclination to fighting, and leſs to declaring War againſt *France* than ever, an Opinion is propagated, that all this is owing to their Perfidy; and wherever we go, the Clamour is ſtrong againſt the Cowardice and Breach of Faith of the *Dutch*, and nothing is commoner than to hear People deliver it as their Sentiments, that high and mighty Perſons ſhould be *Decoitted*. It muſt be indeed allowed, that the *Engliſh* Nation are capable of paſſing ten ſuch Sentences before they execute one. But, however, the very Expreſſion is barbarous, even ſuppoſing it to be well founded; and how much more ſo, if without any Foundation at all? We accuſe the *Dutch* Troops of running away at the Battle of *Fontenoy*; but what Proof is there of this, except as to the Stadtholder's Regiment, which quitted the Field of Battle upon Principle, of which I ſhall ſpeak preſently more at large. *Tournay* was ſaid to be delivered up long before it ought; but I have heard

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ſome of our Countrymen, who were in the Citadel, affirm the contrary of their own Knowledge, and that the *French* actually threw Forty-ſeven thouſand Bombs into the Place. If ſo, it was no Wonder it ſurrender'd, no Wonder that the States did not puniſh the Governor, however People may affect to wonder at it here.

I am not at all devoted to the *Dutch*; and I dare aſſure the Reader, would be the laſt Man living who would attempt apologizing for that People at the Expence of this Nation. No; that is the fartheſt from my Intention: All that I aim at is, to ſhew that we are in the Wrong to run away with an Opinion that the *Dutch* were the Occaſion of all this Miſchief, and that if they had performed their Parts, all Things would have gone well. If this had been really the Caſe, I ſhould have been moſt ready to have proved it, and to have laid the Saddle upon the right Horſe; but if it be otherwiſe, if the Fault lies ſomewhere elſe, why charge it upon them? why exaſperate the Nation againſt their ancient Allies? why make ourſelves

ſelves ridiculous in the Eyes of all *Europe*, by endeavouring to transfer the Blame from thoſe who deſerve it, to thoſe that do not? or why, when we have too many Enemies already, ſtrive to add the *Dutch*, as we did the *Genoeſe*, to their Number?

That the *Dutch* are divided into Parties is true; but this is their Misfortune rather than their Fault: That we have ſome Connection with both Parties, is likewiſe true; and perhaps that is both their Misfortune and ours. That ſeveral Provinces of that Republick have not concurred in the Meaſures purſued in Conjunction with us, is notorious; and that it was from this Principle ſome of their Regiments miſbehaved at the Battle of *Fontenoy*, is what all the World knows. But what can we infer from all this? who can we blame? not the Anti-Stadtholdrian Party, for they have gone as far with us as they could, and would have gone farther if they could; and as to the other Party, they are out of our Reach, and we can only blame ourſelves for having formerly given them ſuch Countenance, as has

has now put it in their Power to diſtreſs thoſe who would ſerve us. This is the true State of the Caſe; the Government of *Holland* is embarraſs'd, they have it not in their Power to act freely, they cannot do what you would have them do; and this was a Thing you always knew, this was the Thing that *France* depended on, this is what has anſwered her Purpoſes: But theſe are not the Folk you talk of *Dewitting*; no, they are the other Sort of People, who, in Spight of all the Difficulties they were under, have with infinite Struggling done all for you that they could.

But to make good this Charge againſt the *Dutch*, to juſtify the Clamour raiſed againſt them, and to ſhew the Nation that they have been the Cauſe of all the Diſaſters that have happen'd in *Flanders*, it ought to be proved that they concurred in thoſe Meaſures which have brought on theſe Diſaſters. This is a Thing incumbent upon their Accuſers, and a Thing from which they never can excuſe themſelves. They ſay, that they gave us falſe Hopes; but would it not be more to the Purpoſe to ſay, what Hopes they gave?

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They ſay, that they have broken, or at leaſt that they have not fulfilled their Engagements; but how can we judge of that, when they have not told us what thoſe Engagements were? They ſay, that they have not imployed the Number of Men they ought to have done; but why do they not ſhew what Number of Men they ought to have employed? why have we not ſeen a Line of Battle of the Army in *Flanders* ſince the Campaign began? or why are we to take all theſe Things for granted, not only without Evidence, but againſt Appearances, which are all moſt ſtrongly on the other Side.

We have ſhewn what the conſtant Principles, and the invariable Maxims of this State have formerly been, and we have ſhewn that their preſent Conduct is perfectly conſiſtent with them. This ſeems to be a plain Proof that they never did vary their Scheme, or in plain Terms propos'd to act offenſively againſt *France*. If they did not, it was Madneſs to truſt them, or rather to rely upon them; if they did, that might,

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and muſt be ſhewn. We have the more Reaſon to expect this, becauſe it was done in the laſt general War: Every Body knew then who our Allies were, and what thoſe Allies were to do. The Phraſe of *The Common Cauſe*, and all the Arguments that juſtify the preſent War, are clearly borrowed from the laſt; why then ſhould we be leſs inform'd as to this, than we were as to that? or why, till theſe Points were ſettled, did we ruſh upon ſuch Meaſures, as nothing, but a Plan ſo ſettled, could either juſtify or ſupport?

But ſuppoſe we look a little on the other Side, and conſider what the *Dutch* may from their preſent Condition be led to think and ſay of us. We know very well that they are a free People, and have hitherto had the Repute of being a wiſe People; it is impoſſible therefore that they ſhould not reflect upon their own Circumſtances, or that they ſhould not uſe their utmoſt Diligence, in order to diſcover what has brought them into theſe Circumſtances. Inſtead of a well-fortified and extenſive Barrier which they lately had,

they have none at all, or at leaſt none that is tenible in the Condition Things are at preſent; they are deeply engaged in a ruinous and deſtructive War, without any ſettled Form of an Alliance from which they may expect Reparation in caſe the Fortune of War ſhould vary; while their Frontiers are expoſed to a powerful and victorious Enemy, a very conſiderable Body of their Troops make a Part of that Army on the *Rhine* commanded by the Grand Duke, and which is ſaid to be neceſſary to facilitate his Election. Yet while in this Reſpect they prefer the common Cauſe to their own, and manifeſtly riſk their Safety to comply with the Schemes of their Allies, the Miniſters of theſe Allies are preſenting Memorial after Memorial, complaining of Slowneſs, Remiſſneſs and Timidity; while the Party in *Holland* that oppoſes the Government, arraigns them with equal Boldneſs for their Raſhneſs, Eagerneſs, and Precipitancy. While you openly accuſe them of being in the *French* Intereſt, becauſe they do not declare War againſt *France*, their Adverſaries

ſaries upbraid them with taking *Engliſh* Money for not accepting the Offers of *France*, and thereby getting out of a deſtructive War, into which they have been plung'd by their Over-Confidence in *Engliſh* Meaſures.

Beſides all this, as we have numerous Stories circulated here to their Prejudice, ſo there want not ſome in *Holland* who propagate Tales no Way advantageous to us; and yet it is not amiſs that we ſhould hear them. They ſay, that you have ſtated the Ends of this War ſo differently, have chang'd your Meaſures in it ſo often, and have acted in it ſo unaccountably with regard to your own Intereſt and their's, that it is impoſſible for them to have any juſt Notion of what you aim at: That when you ſent the Earl of *Stair* over, and he appear'd extreamly agreeable to them; when he had concerted Meaſures with them, and, as they apprehended, was gone to put himſelf at the Head of the Army in order to execute them, his Power was taken away before his Commiſſion, by which the whole Army of the

Allies at the Battle of *Dettingen* was expos'd to an almoſt certain Defeat; which they eſcap'd partly by the Miſtakes of the *French*, and partly by the deſperate Bravery of the Troops; by which a Victory was obtain'd, but not proſecuted. They ſay, that if the Earl of *Stair*'s Advice had been then purſued, either in puſhing the Enemy in Conjunction with the *Auſtrians*, or by transferring the War into the *Low-Countries*, at the only Juncture when doing any thing there was practicable, there might have been a happy and ſpeedy End put to the War; inſtead of which, that Nobleman return'd to the *Hague*, and took his Leave of the States by a Memorial, in which he tacitly acknowledged that he was laid aſide after giving this good Advice, and perhaps for giving it. They ſay, that with Regard to the laſt Campaign, there was no Plan of Operations concerted, no proper Proviſion made for executing them if they had been concerted, by which the Superiority they had in *Flanders*, after the *French* King march'd with the beſt Part of his Troops

Troops to the Relief of *Alſace*, was entirely and unavoidably loſt, which, if it was diſagreeable to you, was fatal to them; and that it was abſurd and unnatural to preſs them under ſuch Circumſtances to declare War againſt *France*, when it was eaſily foreſeen, that, by a Continuance of the ſame Conduct, they ſhould be at laſt left to the Mercy of *France*. This is what they ſay; and it deſerves to be conſidered, ſince all equal Judges are content to hear both Parties before they decide; and ſince it is our Intereſt, as well as theirs, that we ſhould be fully ſatisfied they are in the Wrong, before we pretend to cenſure them, before we throw the Blame of all Miſcarriages upon them, and while they have an Enemy at their Door, and are in immediate Diſtreſs, endeavour alſo to drive them into Deſpair.

But perhaps it may be ſaid, and indeed it is commonly ſaid, What has all this to do with the preſent Campaign? why were not the Troops early enough in the Field?

how

how came it to paſs that the Army of the Allies was not numerous enough, either to undertake a Siege of Importance themſelves, or to force the *French* to raiſe the Siege of *Tournay?* Theſe are the Things that merit Enquiry, and not Matters that are long ago paſt, and beyond all Amendment. But if you imagine that theſe Demands are much in your Favour, and that the Facts on which they are grounded are abſolutely unanſwerable, there are People in *Holland* of a quite different Opinion, and who abſolutely retort all theſe Queſtions upon you. This may be News in *England*; but it is News that we ought to hear, tho' it does not come over in the *Hague Gazette.* In ſhort, they ſay, that if there had been Forty thouſand Men in *Engliſh* Pay, as it was promis'd there ſhould be, and of which there were not much above Half; if the *Auſtrians* had furniſhed their Contingent inſtead of ſending the Fourth of it, or perhaps not quite ſo many, there might have been ſome Hopes of anſwering your Expectations; but, as it was, the Army of the Allies, the better

Half

Half of which conſiſted of *Dutch* Troops, was able to do little, and ſoon after, by the great Detachments the Generals thought fit to make, and for which they alone can account, was put out of a Condition of doing any thing; by which the *French* have obtain'd that vaſt Superiority which now threatens the Safety of *England*, but at the ſame Time menaces the Deſtruction of *Holland*. Thus you ſee, that while you impute all Things to the *Dutch*, there are People in *Holland* who impute Things to quite different Cauſes; for while you complain of Towns given up and loſt by *Dutch* Governors, they are no leſs angry at the Loſs of thoſe Towns, for Want of your Army to protect them, after they had taken ſo much Pains, and run ſuch Hazards to procure one.

Yet ſtill this is not all they ſay, they add many things with regard to other parts of the Syſtem; they ſay, that with great Alacrity they marched a numerous Body of their Troops into *Germany*, in hopes that ſomething deciſive might have been done there Time enough to have

reaped

reaped the Benefit of thoſe Troops afterwards in *Flanders*; but that notwithſtanding the *French* were diſperſed in their Quarters, and their Force far enough from being formidable, yet there was nothing done, till the Prince of *Conti* formed ſuch an Army as put it out of the Power of the Allies to do any thing except joining Field Marſhal *Traun*, by many long and fatiguing Marches; and that this Corps of *Dutch* Forces at this Inſtant, and while the Frontiers of their own Country are thus expoſed, make a part of an Army of Obſervation in *Germany*, deſtin'd in all Appearance to wait the Iſſue of the Election at *Frankfort*, and are therefore abſolutely uſeleſs to their Country on that Side where their Preſence would be moſt Natural and of the greateſt Conſequence. They ſay, that in order to replace theſe Troops, they have labour'd inceſſantly to bring down the *Munſterians*, and that with this View they have employed one of their ableſt Miniſters at the Court of the Elector of *Cologne*, where he ſtill reſides; but that, except fair Words and fruitleſs Promiſes,

miſes, he has been able to obtain nothing, the Vexation of which has had ſuch an Effect upon his Spirits, that his Negociation is in great Danger of ending with his Life.

But if theſe Things be ſaid by your Friends in *Holland*, thoſe who notwithſtanding your Connection with the Houſe of *Orange* profeſs themſelves no longer ſuch, ſay many more and much ſtronger Things. They ſay, that you have taken ſo much Care of *Germany*, and by pretending to anſwer for the Princes and States of that Country, have led their Government into ſuch Meaſures, as have brought thoſe Miſchiefs both upon them and you. They ſay, that no due Care was taken to perſuade the Court of *Vienna* to make any Terms with *Pruſſia*, though that was of the utmoſt Conſequence to the common Cauſe, as it would have ſav'd a great Expence, and have given the Allies in this Campaign a prodigious Superiority over the *French*. They ſay, that after all the Pains that has been taken, the Elec-

tion of the Grand Duke is ſtill very uncertain, and the Conſequences of it yet more ſo: That the Army of Obſervation to be formed by the States of the Empire is a mere Chimera, or rather a new Invention to extort Subſidies: That the Conduct of ſome *German Troops*, of late, makes it very doubtful whether any of thoſe Mercenaries are to be depended on; and that in ſhort, the dangerous Condition into which the *States* have brought themſelves by following your Counſels, has left them no other Choice to make, but that of minding at laſt their own Concerns.

The Concluſion then of the whole Matter is this, That it is idle, unjuſt, and dangerous to miſlead and deceive the People, by imputing the Miſchiefs brought upon us to falſe Cauſes; and therefore it is much better for the *Engliſh* Nation, to leave all theſe Points to the Deciſion of their Repreſentatives in Parliament, for whoſe Information theſe Facts have been thrown together, and to whom I appeal. They will doubtleſs enquire what Propoſitions were

were originally made to the *States* of *Holland*, in what Manner the Terms of the War were laid down: Whether theſe Propoſitions tended to anſwer the End of our Guaranty, to preſerve the Dominions of the Queen of *Hungary*, and thereby to obtain on reaſonable Terms a ſpeedy Peace: Whether the *States* made any Objections to extravagant Projects, beyond the Force of the Maritime Powers to execute, or remonſtrated the Neceſſity of keeping within Bounds, and petending to do no more than what we had a Right to do, and an Ability of doing: Whether the drawing the War into the *Low-Countries*, which has been ſo fatal to them and to us, was done without their Conſent and againſt their repeated Repreſentations, as has been reported: Whether before the preſent Campaign, and when it was publickly declared here, that the Ends of the War were chang'd, the *States General* entered into any new Engagements, and what: Whether thoſe Engagements have not been ſince broke thro', and by whom: Whether there were not

ſome

ſome ſecret Reaſons for declining the Treaty of *Hanau*, and what they were: Whether no Remonſtrances were made by the *Dutch* on that Head; and many other Things which may contribute to ſhew us what has really produced the Loſs of the *Dutch* Barrier, and our preſent Terror of Invaſions.

F I N I S.